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Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity: Justifiability of
Strong Hard Paternalism in Public Health Regulation
THADDEUS MASON POPE
Because of the largely self-regarding nature of obesity, many current
and proposed public health regulatory measures are paternalistic. That is,
these measures interfere with a person’s liberty with the primary goal of
improving that person’s own welfare.
Paternalistic public health measures may be effective in reducing
obesity. They may even be the only sufficiently effective type of regulation.
But many commentators argue that paternalistic public health measures
are not politically viable enough to get enacted. After all, paternalism is
repugnant in our individualistic culture. It is “wrong” for the government
to limit our liberty for our own good.
In this Article, I argue that such pessimism is misplaced. Defeatist and
despairing commentators are working with an impoverished conceptual
framework. I offer a richer vocabulary. By linking current debates in
public health ethics to classic works in normative jurisprudence and the
philosophy of law, I distinguish ethically distinct types of hard paternalism.
Each has its own unique conditions for justifiability. By focusing on these
differences, I demonstrate that there are abundant opportunities for hard
paternalistic regulatory measures to address obesity and other public
health problems.
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Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity: Justifiability of
Strong Hard Paternalism in Public Health Regulation
THADDEUS MASON POPE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Obesity is a major public health problem.1 Fortunately, there is a wide
range of regulatory efforts that federal, state, and local governments can
take to address the problem.2 But because of the largely self-regarding
nature of obesity, many of the current and proposed regulatory measures
are paternalistic.3 That is, these measures may interfere with a person’s
individual liberty with the goal of improving his welfare.4
Will paternalistic regulatory measures be effective in reducing obesity?
Are they politically viable enough to get enacted? In Public Health
Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, Professor Friedman is not
optimistic that we can answer either of these two questions affirmatively.
He argues that paternalism “has peaked” and “may have reached the
*

Director of the Health Law Institute and Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University;
Adjunct Professor, Australian Centre for Health Law Research, Queensland University of Technology;
Adjunct Associate Professor, Albany Medical College.
1
David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 1687, 1711–14 (2014).
2
Public health law experts identify seven distinct types of legal tools that regulators can use to
promote public health: (1) taxation and spending; (2) altering the information environment (e.g.,
labeling, advertising); (3) altering the built environment (e.g., zoning to encourage physical activity);
(4) altering the socioeconomic environment; (5) direct regulation; (6) deregulation; and (7) tort
liability. See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 35–40
(2000) (discussing public health regulation through taxation and spending); World Health Org.,
European Charter on Counteracting Obesity, EUR/06/5062700/8 (Nov. 16, 2006) (noting that it should
be a priority to provide affordable, healthy choices to lower socioeconomic population groups); Julie
Ralston Aoki et al., Beyond the Code Book: Legal Tools for Accelerating Progress in Obesity
Prevention, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 61, 61–65 (2013) (pointing out the possibility of tort liability as a
way to promote public health); James G. Hodge et al., New Frontiers in Obesity Control: Innovative
Public Health Interventions, 5 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 1–2 (2013) (noting that altering the
built environment and altering the information environment are two reforms considered by regulators);
Robert MacCoun et al., Assessing Alternative Drug Control Regimes, 15 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
330, 331–38 (1996) (discussing different types of drug control regimes ranging from prohibition to
deregulation); Bryan Thomas & Lawrence O. Gostin, Tackling the NCD Crisis: Innovations in Law
and Governance, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 16, 19–21 (2013) (providing governmental strategies for
addressing non-communicable diseases).
3
See generally Friedman, supra note 1, Part III.B.2.
4
See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard
Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2004) (“Paternalism is the restriction of a subject’s selfregarding conduct for the good of that same subject.”).
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natural limits of effectiveness.” Specifically, Friedman contends that
paternalistic regulatory measures to address obesity suffer from two types
of material limitations: efficacy problems and practicality problems.6
Friedman’s argument proceeds in two stages. First, he argues that soft
paternalistic measures are not sufficiently efficacious.7 These measures,
which alter the decision-making environment, yet do not wholly eliminate
unhealthy choices, are usually too weak to adequately address the obesity
problem.8 They are insufficient to overcome human biases and change
personal behavior.9 Friedman contends that hard paternalistic measures
are needed that ban the unhealthy choices and make them impossible.10
In the second stage of his argument, Friedman argues that we cannot
have what we need.11 Having already established the necessity for hard
paternalism, Friedman argues that it is impractical because hard
paternalism is too socially unpalatable to deploy.12 It has, Friedman
explains, “reached natural limits in terms of popular viability.”13
I am more optimistic than Friedman. The Rolling Stones may be right
that “you can’t always get what you want.”14 But they are also right that
“if you try sometime you find you get what you need.”15 This will be my
overarching theme: We can get the hard paternalism that we need. For the
sake of argument, I will accept Friedman’s contention that only hard
paternalistic measures are sufficient to adequately address the obesity
problem.16 I focus this responsive commentary on disputing the second
part of Friedman’s argument that hard paternalism is impractical and
unacceptable.
Friedman contends that we cannot get the hard paternalism that we
need.17 But he fails to distinguish materially different types of hard
paternalism. Admittedly, the public has rejected, and will continue to
5

Friedman, supra note 1, at 1693–94.
See id. (“[F]inding viable opportunities to change consumption and physical activity patterns
through hard paternalism proves difficult, and soft paternalism can prove ineffective.”).
7
Id. at 1694.
8
Id. at 1701–03, 1768–69.
9
Id. at 1768.
10
Id. at 1769.
11
See id. at 1694 (“Paternalism has peaked, for now, in the realm of public health regulation.”).
12
Id. at 1767–68.
13
Id. at 1710.
14
THE ROLLING STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, on LET IT BLEED (London
Records 1969).
15
Id.
16
While I do not have space here to review the empirical research, this claim seems more than
plausible. See, e.g., One in Three in the UK Can’t Afford to Eat Healthily, NUFFIELD HEALTH (Jan. 14,
2014), http://www.nuffieldhealth.com/fitness-and-wellbeing/news/One-in-three-in-the-UK-cant-affordto-eat-healthily (finding twenty percent of obese people surveyed “would rather be overweight than
watch what they eat”).
17
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1767.
6
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reject, many types of hard paternalistic regulation. But they have not
rejected all types of hard paternalism.19 My primary objective in this
Article is to draw some conceptual distinctions that light the path forward
for justifiable hard paternalistic measures to address obesity.
In Part II, I summarize Friedman’s argument regarding the necessity,
yet impracticality, of hard paternalism. Then in Parts III and IV, I draw
two sets of distinctions that help distinguish practical hard paternalism
from impractical hard paternalism.
In Part III, I distinguish “weak” hard paternalism from “strong” hard
paternalism. Friedman uses “hard paternalism” to focus on the degree of
liberty interference.20 He fails to consider the reason or motivation for the
interference. By attending to this dimension, it becomes clear that the
range of potentially practical and efficacious hard paternalism is actually
broader than what Friedman concludes is viable.
Finally, in Part IV, I make two arguments for the justifiability of hard
paternalism. First, weak hard paternalism is almost always justified
because it entails only the restriction of conduct that is not substantially
voluntary. Second, even strong hard paternalism is sometimes justified;
while restricting an individual’s self-regarding, substantially voluntary
conduct is rarely justified, it can be under certain circumstances. Strong
hard paternalism therefore should not be categorically dismissed as
impractical and unacceptable. I defend seven conditions under which hard
paternalistic public health measures are justified.
I conclude that Friedman is too pessimistic and parsimonious. He
thinks that there is only a smattering of opportunities for hard paternalism
to address obesity. By distinguishing ethically distinct types of hard
paternalism, I demonstrate that there are abundant opportunities for hard
paternalistic regulatory measures to address obesity and other public health
problems.
II. SUMMARY OF FRIEDMAN’S ARGUMENT
Friedman argues that public health regulators are in a no-win situation.
They can make material progress on attacking difficult problems like
obesity only by using hard paternalistic interventions.21 But hard
paternalistic interventions are not politically viable.22 So, regulators are in
18
See id. at 1692 (concluding, based on the examples of marijuana legalization, fluoridation, and
genetically modified foods, that the public has definitely rejected “visible, hard paternalism”).
19
See id. at 1709 (suggesting that hidden hard paternalism may still be a viable option for
regulating the public’s behavior and choices).
20
See id. at 1694–95 (adopting Gerald Dworkin’s definition of paternalism).
21
See id. at 1743–53 (stating that hard paternalism is difficult to implement, but that the
alternative of soft paternalism is a weaker regulatory force).
22
See id. at 1767 (arguing that the public’s negative reaction to deprivations of autonomy makes
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a “bind.” Paternalistic intervention “present[s] tradeoffs in terms of ease
[of intervention] and effectiveness.”24 What is acceptable does not work.
And what works is not acceptable.
I will unpack and explicate Friedman’s argument in three stages. First,
I clarify his terminology, distinguishing his use of soft paternalism and
hard paternalism. Second, I explain his two-part contention—that hard
paternalism is necessary to address obesity, yet impractical. Third, I
discuss a small window of opportunity that Friedman leaves open for hard
paternalism: two exceptions to his “rule” of impracticality.
A. Soft Paternalism and Hard Paternalism
By “soft paternalism,” Friedman means regulatory measures that
(a) attempt to improve individual welfare by altering the decision-making
environment to lead people to make better choices, yet (b) do not wholly
eliminate the unhealthy choices.25 In other words, soft paternalistic
measures enhance decision making while preserving individual autonomy
and discretion.26
Friedman rightly observes that soft paternalism can be more or less
interventional.27 He maps out three tiers of soft paternalistic intervention.28
First, starting at the low end of the spectrum, the government may provide
raw factual information to consumers.29 For example, the Food and Drug
Administration mandates nutrition labeling on food packages.30 This helps
people make more informed purchasing and consumption decisions.
Second, the government might offer “truthful narratives” to illustrate
the risks from certain choices.31 These concrete instances of harm can be
more effective than simple informational disclosures.32 Vivid and
entertaining examples are more cognitively and emotionally compelling.33
hard paternalistic interventions difficult to implement).
23
Id. at 1769.
24
Id. at 1726.
25
Id. at 1696 n.38, 1701.
26
Id.
27
See id. at 1698–99 (providing examples of the varying degrees of intervention and defining a
spectrum of paternalistic interventionism).
28
Id.; see also Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
199–202, 210, 215, 225–27 (2006) (arguing that raw factual information should be given to consumers,
the government should offer truthful narratives, and insulating strategies might sometimes be
appropriate).
29
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1698, 1701–03.
30
21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1–101.108 (2013).
31
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1699, 1703–05.
32
See id. at 1735, 1737 (providing an example of a movie that impacted young adults’ attitudes
toward fast food, but noting that “these delivery mechanisms for new and different types of narratives
have yet to be exploited”).
33
See id. at 1703–04 (discussing the theory behind and examples of strong-form debiasing in the
contexts of smoking and overconsumption of fast food).
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For example, a recent Georgia advertisement campaign featured stark
billboards and television commercials featuring sad, overweight children.34
These images were designed “to shock families into recognizing that
obesity is a problem.”35
Third, in the hardest soft paternalistic regulation, the government
might require certain “insulating strategies.”36 These conditional mandates
impose certain restrictions on activities to make them safer and to insulate
participants from harm. The classic examples are traffic laws mandating
the use of automobile seatbelts and motorcycle helmets.37 These
regulations require use of a safety device. But, like all soft paternalistic
measures, they still preserve the individual’s choice to engage in the “core
activity.”38 Similarly, while sin taxes may be coercive,39 they do not
wholly eliminate the choice, for example, to smoke or to drink soda.40
In contrast to soft paternalism, hard paternalism entails “outright
bans.”41 By “hard paternalism,” Friedman means regulatory measures that
attempt to improve individual welfare by eliminating some choices and
making them impossible.42 In other words, hard paternalistic measures
enhance decision making by removing autonomy and discretion.43 They
“completely substitute the regulator’s judgment for that of the
consumer.”44
For example, contrast tobacco and marijuana. Government regulators
34
See Carrie Teegardin, Grim Childhood Obesity Ads Stir Critics, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 29,
2011, at 1A (reporting that some people did not approve of an Atlanta hospital’s blunt advertising
campaign against childhood obesity).
35
Kathy Lohr, Controversy Swirls Around Harsh Anti-Obesity Ads, NPR (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/09/144799538/controversy-swirls-around-harsh-anti-obesity-ads.
36
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1699, 1705–07.
37
See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of
Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 435–38 (2000) (providing a history of the laws
regarding automobile seatbelts and motorcycle helmets in terms of the gradual acceptance of
paternalism in those areas).
38
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1705. What constitutes the core activity is hardly an uncontroversial
claim. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 122–23, 129,
276–77, 282, 294, 304–05 (1986) (providing examples from criminal law concerning deceit,
voluntariness, consent, and false pretense where alternative interpretations and perspectives of an act
may lead to different outcomes); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and
Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1858 (2013) (noting the difficulty of “identify[ing] the level of
generality at which people’s ends are to be described”). See generally CARL GINET, ON ACTION 45–71
(1990) (discussing key literature on individuation).
39
See FEINBERG, supra note 38, at 23–25.
40
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1706–07 (explaining that with taxation the choice to smoke or
drink “has merely been impeded by compelling the consumer to internalize the social cost of
consumption”).
41
Id. at 1699.
42
Id. at 1696 n.38, 1699, 1707.
43
Id. at 1696 n.38.
44
Id. at 1701.
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impose all sorts of soft paternalistic measures to reduce tobacco use; the
packaging is labeled with the health risks45 and advertisement campaigns
feature diseased and disfigured former smokers.46 And tobacco products
are subject to significant excise taxes.47 But tobacco is still readily
available, and millions continue to smoke.48 In contrast, when it comes to
marijuana and other recreational drugs, regulators do not stop at soft
paternalism—these products are categorically banned.49
B. The Necessity, Yet Impracticality, of Hard Paternalism
Once we understand Friedman’s vocabulary, grasping his argument is
straightforward. Friedman argues that anything less than a “full-court
press” against obesity will likely result in only “minimal returns.”50
Nutritional disclosures and other soft paternalistic measures have proven
only mildly effective.51 They just do not have enough “power” to put
“significant dents” in the obesity problem.52 Only with hard paternalistic
regulatory measures can we change the eating and drinking habits of
hundreds of millions of people.
But we cannot have the hard paternalism that we need. Friedman
argues that in a “full-court press,” regulators will encounter “political
resistance to paternalistic endeavors.”53 There are, he contends, “limits to
the types and degrees of regulatory intervention that the public” accepts.54
We need hard paternalism to change the way people behave when they eat
and drink. But the public generally rejects hard paternalism.55 Its

45

15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
See Tips from Former Smokers, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 3,
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/videos (describing the individuals featured
on campaign advertisements who lost limbs, hair, and teeth due to smoking).
47
See State Cigarette Excise Taxes: 2011 and 2012, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 25,
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/2011-state-cigarette-excise-taxes.aspx (showing the tax on
cigarettes in each state).
48
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50
YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 703 (2014), available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf (explaining that
despite progress being made in the United States, there is still “persistence of high prevalence of
tobacco use among segments of the population”).
49
Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related to Marijuana, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL
POL’Y (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana.
50
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1719.
51
Id. at 1731.
52
Id. at 1769.
53
Id. at 1719. “A full effort or total war on obesity would run into two distinct categories of
obstacles: (1) hostility toward paternalism; and (2) the complexity of the problem . . . .” Id. at 1767.
54
Id. at 1691.
55
Id.
46
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“appetite for hard paternalism . . . can be uneasy.” Friedman is hardly
alone in this assessment.57
Accordingly, if regulators prudently targeted their resources and
focused on those strategies that the “public will support, or at least not
aggressively oppose,” then they would focus on soft paternalistic
measures.58 They would eschew hard paternalistic strategies.59 But those
are precisely the sorts of efforts that are needed to effectively combat
obesity. Soft paternalism is practical but inefficacious. Hard paternalism
is efficacious but impractical.
C. Small Window for Hard Paternalism
But all is not lost. Friedman argues that “hard paternalism can still be
deployed effectively under the right circumstances.”60 There may be
“spots” where hard paternalism can provide opportunities for high impact
interventions.61
Friedman argues that there are two such “spots” for hard paternalism.
First, he argues that hard paternalism can work “[i]f the zone of the
regulation already falls within natural control of the regulator.”62 Second,
56
Id. at 1720. “[T]he public attitude toward paternalism in contexts involving private
consumption . . . may be trending negative.” Id. at 1744. “Hard paternalism may prove difficult to
implement . . . because of the public’s reaction to the complete deprivation of autonomy.” Id. at 1753.
Friedman bolsters this argument by looking to marijuana, fluoride, and GMOs. See id. Part III.C (using
regulation marijuana and fluoridation as examples of the political resistance to hard paternalism and
GMOs as an example of the expansion of choice by regulators).
57
See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 2, at 497 (“[A] person’s decision about what to eat . . . affects
only him- or herself, so many do not see government intervention as justifiable.”); PEW RESEARCH
CTR., PUBLIC AGREES ON OBESITY’S IMPACT, NOT GOVERNMENT’S ROLE 1–2 (2013) (presenting
statistics on the public’s opposition to government regulation as a way to combat American obesity);
Aoki et al., supra note 2, at 62 (describing the concerns that decision makers may have with vending or
supplier contracts that promote healthy options because they are focused on immediate budget concerns
instead of long term health benefits); Lawrence O. Gostin, Limiting What We Can Eat: A Bridge Too
Far?, 92 MILBANK Q. 173, 173 (2014) (noting that the public is comfortable with the government
controlling other sectors, such as the economy or infectious diseases, but “often draws a line at limiting
dietary choices”); Rick Mayes & Thomas R. Oliver, Chronic Disease and the Shifting Focus of Public
Health: Is Prevention Still a Political Lightweight?, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 181, 185–86 (2012)
(arguing that it is difficult to advocate, from a political perspective, for the imposition of immediate
burdens in exchange for uncertain, long-term benefits); Thomas & Gostin, supra note 2, at 17
(“[P]revention strategies often have a whiff of paternalism, and this can be a distinct political
liability.”).
58
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1720 (“The political feasibility of disclosure may indeed tempt
policymakers. But many are still skeptical about whether this easier form of regulation . . . will prove
effective.”); see also PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 57, at 5 (“[V]iews on what government should
do are closely linked to perceptions of what the government can do.”).
59
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1692, 1767–68 (describing the public’s uneasiness and general
dislike for hard paternalism).
60
Id. at 1744.
61
Id. at 1753.
62
Id.
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Friedman contends that hard paternalistic measures might be acceptable if
they are inoffensive.63 I will focus on this second opportunity for hard
paternalism.
Even though outright bans eliminate choice, the public may experience
no “perception of loss.”64 Friedman provides two main examples: the
banning of lead paint and the banning of trans-fats.65 In both cases the
bans were implemented with “little protest or notice.”66 Friedman argues
that these hard paternalistic measures were accepted by the public because
they did not “visibly reduce choice.”67 The public was “shield[ed]” from
the autonomy deprivation.68 They accepted these hard paternalistic
measures because they were “hidden” bans.69
But Friedman argues that this “hidden paternalism” exception is
narrow.70 He explains, “[T]he opportunities for deploying paternalism
effectively in the public health arena may prove limited.”71 It is difficult to
identify food restrictions that prove “intangible or negligibly detectible.”72
People may not mind the absence of trans-fats, but they certainly noticed
New York Mayor Bloomberg’s ban on sugary drinks larger than sixteen
ounces.73
Friedman is probably correct that “regulators can intervene somewhat
more easily . . . [if] their paternalistic presence is not felt.”74 But he is
equally correct that people are unlikely to disregard or ignore most hard
paternalistic regulatory measures aimed at combatting obesity.75 In short,
it may be quite a challenge to find “hidden paternalism” opportunities
where regulators can eliminate unhealthy choices without people noticing.
In sum, Friedman has carved out two narrow instances where hard
63

Id. at 1747–51.
Id. at 1747.
65
Id. at 1707–09.
66
Id. at 1709.
67
Id. (emphasis added). Again, this is a potential individuation problem because it could be
described as a soft paternalistic insulting measure. See id. (“When a paternalistic move does not visibly
reduce choice but enhances individual welfare, the ban may prove to be a practical and effective
prescription for a problem, even if a narrow one.”).
68
Id. at 1737–38.
69
Id. at 1709, 1749.
70
Id. at 1709.
71
Id. at 1769.
72
Id. at 1747.
73
See id. at 1690 (noting that a “broad segment of the population objected” to the ban); see also
Kara Marcello, Note, The New York City Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Portion Cap Rule: Lawfully
Regulating Public Enemy Number One in the Obesity Epidemic, 46 CONN. L. REV. 807, 851 (2013)
(noting that a poll conducted prior to the ban’s passage found that six out of ten New York City
residents opposed it).
74
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1747.
75
See id. (noting that redesigning the SNAP subsidy “to directly displace bad choices like soda
would . . . generate an outcry that is reminiscent of the Big Gulp ban”).
64
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paternalism might be practical. Are they enough? Even Friedman himself
concludes that they probably are not.76 But, as I will argue below in Part
IV, there are further situations in which hard paternalistic measures to
combat obesity are practical.
III. VOCABULARY OF PATERNALISM
Unfortunately, contemporary legal and philosophical literature on
paternalism employs a different vocabulary than the literature of the
preceding three decades. Confusingly, today’s writers in normative
jurisprudence and public health ethics are using many of the same terms
that were used by writers in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. But they are
using those terms to mean different things.
For example, while Friedman claims to “adopt Gerald Dworkin’s . . .
definition of paternalism,” he does not.77 In distinguishing “hard” and
“soft” paternalism, Friedman focuses on the type or manner of the
intervention. For Friedman, the difference between “hard” and “soft”
paternalism depends on the amount of liberty restricted.78
In contrast, Dworkin, like most philosophers and public health ethicists
during the last third of the twentieth century, distinguishes “hard” and
“soft” paternalism by instead focusing on the motivation or reason for the
intervention.79 On this ground we can distinguish three separate liberty
limiting principles: the harm principle, weak paternalism, and strong
paternalism.
A. Harm Principle
Friedman rightly observes that “in addition to concerns about
individual health, the external costs of obesity are pressing.”80 Indeed, in
2008, estimated health care costs related to obesity were $147 billion.81 By
2030, medical costs associated with obesity are expected to increase by at
least $48 billion annually, with the annual loss in economic productivity
totaling $390 billion to $580 billion.82
Friedman notes that these significant negative externalities may
76
See id. at 1693–94 (“[V]iable opportunities to change consumption and physical activity
patterns through hard paternalism proves difficult, and soft paternalism can prove ineffective.”).
77
Id. at 1694. Friedman recognizes that various definitions of “hard paternalism” and “soft
paternalism” are in circulation. Id. at 1694 n.38.
78
Id. at 1696–97.
79
See Pope, supra note 4, at 678–79 (discussing the role of motivation in soft paternalism).
80
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714.
81
Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer-and ServiceSpecific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. w822, w828 (2009).
82
TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, F AS IN FAT: HOW OBESITY THREATENS AMERICA’S FUTURE
28 (2012).
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“render[] the label of paternalism less pejorative.”
That is a huge
understatement. If the primary motivation for liberty limitation (whether
of Friedman’s soft or hard variety) is to prevent harm to others, then the
regulation is not paternalistic at all.84 It would, instead, be ethically
grounded on the harm principle.
The harm principle, or prevention of harm to others, has traditionally
been recognized as having the greatest moral legitimacy of all libertylimiting principles, because preventing or reducing harm to others is a
classic and core function of government and a traditional exercise of police
power.85 Liberty limitation on this ground is publicly accepted.86
Public health regulators seem to have more than enough data to
credibly defend even total bans on the basis of preventing harm to others or
harm to society. So, it is worth noting that while government interference
with the eating and drinking decisions of individuals might look
paternalistic, it need not be defended or perceived as paternalistic. To the
extent that the harm principle can be plausibly invoked, public health
regulators can avoid hard paternalism’s efficacy-practicality bind.87
B. Weak Paternalism
While the harm principle is infinitely malleable, at some point the
negative externalities become too small and distant to credibly ground
liberty limitation on the basis of harm to others. Therefore, some public
health regulation will be paternalistic.
But not all paternalism (not even all soft and hard paternalism) has the
same ethical and moral status. One must look not only to the degree of
intervention (which distinguishes hard and soft paternalism) but also to the
reason for the intervention. Paternalism is most justified on the basis that
the individual lacks the requisite decision-making capacity.
This “weak paternalism” justifies intervention on the basis that the
individual has assumed a risk without adequate information, without
sufficient maturity, or without adequate freedom from coercion. The
classic example, from John Stuart Mill, is detaining someone who is about
83
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714. He later asks “whether regulators should be concerned with
the aggregate social problem as opposed to individual personal choice.” Id. at 1727.
84
See Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1863 (noting that it is possible to justify governmental
limitations without reference to paternalistic considerations).
85
See Pope, supra note 37, at 428.
86
See Eric Crampton et al., The Cost of Cost Studies 7–9 (Dept. of Econ. & Fin., Col. of Bus. &
Econ.,
Univ.
of
Canterbury,
Working
Paper
No.
29,
2011),
available
at
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1129.pdf (noting policymaker-driven harm
reduction in the context of alcohol abuse).
87
Thaddeus M. Pope, The Slow Transition of U.S. Law Toward a Greater Emphasis on
Prevention, in PREVENTION VS. TREATMENT: WHAT’S THE RIGHT BALANCE? 223 (Halley S. Faust &
Paul T. Menzel eds., 2012).
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to unknowingly cross a dilapidated, dangerous bridge.
Under these circumstances it cannot fairly be said that the individual
was free or autonomous in the first place because she did not understand
what she was doing.89 Therefore, restricting the individual’s liberty does
not impinge her autonomy. For these reasons, weak and strong
paternalistic measures combatting obesity have met with “positive”
responses.90
C. Strong Paternalism
While weak paternalism overrides an individual’s choices because they
are not informed or voluntary, “strong” paternalism overrides choices even
when they are informed and voluntary.91
Strong paternalism is the position that it is morally justifiable to protect
adults, against their will, from the harmful consequences of their choices,
even when those choices are informed and voluntary and do not harm
others.92 Thus, hard paternalism holds that autonomy can be trumped by
beneficence. The welfare of an individual can outweigh her right to selfdetermination.93
IV. JUSTIFIABILITY OF HARD PATERNALISTIC
PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION
When Friedman concludes that hard paternalism is impractical and
unacceptable, he seems to assume that hard paternalism is necessarily
strong. This is wrong on two counts. First, hard paternalism can be weak
and, therefore, well-justified. Second, even strong hard paternalism is
justified under some conditions.

88
See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS 1, 123
(John M. Robson ed., 1966) (“[T]hey might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement
of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the
river.”).
89
Pope, supra note 37, at 430.
90
See Hodge et al., supra note 2, at 36–37 (noting that mostly positive responses followed
restriction of soda in public schools); cf. Bijan Fateh-Moghadam & Thomas Gutmann, Governing
[through] Autonomy. The Moral and Legal Limits of “Soft Paternalism,” 17 ETHICAL THEORY &
MORAL PRAC. 383 (2014) (providing a critique of paternalism generally).
91
See Pope, supra note 4, at 717 (describing the elements of hard paternalism, which include “the
agent disregard[ing] the subject’s contemporaneous preferences”); Pope, supra note 37, at 430
(“‘[H]ard’ or ‘strong’ paternalism . . . constrains individuals’ decisions even when those decisions are
informed and voluntary.” (footnote omitted)).
92
See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to
Joel Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121, 123 (2005) (defining hard paternalism).
93
See Pope, supra note 4, at 683–84 (“[T]he agent must limit the subject’s liberty primarily
because she believes that intervention will contribute to the subject’s welfare . . . [and] the agent’s
benevolent motive must be independent from the subject’s contemporaneous preferences.”).
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A. Weak Hard Paternalism
Weak paternalism is usually soft paternalism. If decision making is
distorted by ignorance and biases, then the most appropriate regulation is
that designed to correct for the informational deficits and biases.94 Indeed,
the substantial overlap between weak and soft paternalism probably
explains why the public accepts soft paternalism.95 They accept it not
because it is soft, but because it is weak.
While weak paternalism is usually soft, it is sometimes hard. The
classic example is public health regulation for the protection of children.
Contrast the new IRS excise tax on tanning beds96 with state bans on
minors using indoor tanning.97 The excise tax is soft paternalism, because
it leaves the individual free to choose indoor tanning. The total ban is hard
paternalism, because it completely removes the option. But since these
bans are directed only at minors (who are presumed unable to make
substantially voluntary decisions), the hard paternalism is weak.
In short, a significant range of hard paternalism is weak. And weak
paternalism is almost always justified and acceptable.98
So, by
distinguishing weak from strong hard paternalism, we find already that the
opportunities for hard paternalistic public health regulation are not as
meager as Friedman concludes they are.
B. Strong Hard Paternalism
While Friedman does not distinguish between weak and strong hard
paternalism, he seems to assume that hard paternalism is necessarily
strong. On this assumption, he concedes that strong hard paternalism is
sometimes justified and acceptable.99 He focuses on the situation in which
“[t]he forgone autonomy is invisible or simply has no value.”100 In this
section, I argue that strong hard paternalism may be ethically and
politically acceptable apart from when it is just “stealthy in
implementation.”101
94
Recognize that under such regulations consumers are not only “free to choose” but “more
equipped” to make accurate decisions. Id. at 1730.
95
See id. at 1733 (noting that “the positive reaction to the soft paternalism of mandatory calorie
disclosure has not been overwhelmed by any noticeable popular backlash”).
96
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10907, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (2012)); 26 C.F.R. § 49.5000B–1T (2013).
97
Indoor Tanning Restrictions for Minors—A State-by-State Comparison, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/indoor-tanning-restrictions.aspx (last updated Feb.
2014).
98
See Pope, supra note 92, at 122–23 (“[S]oft paternalistic regulation actually helps to protect and
promote [autonomy] by ensuring that an individual’s choices reflect her true preferences.”).
99
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1697, 1709.
100
Id. at 1709.
101
Id.
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I argue that strong hard paternalistic liberty limitation (SHP) is
justified when: (1) there is strong evidence that each of the following six
conditions is satisfied; (2) the objective of the SHP is to protect the subject
from significant harm; (3) the subject has either a low autonomy interest or
an irrational high autonomy interest in the restricted conduct; (4) the SHP
is imposed only if no morally preferable, less autonomy restrictive
alternatives are available; (5) the SHP has a high probability of
success/effectiveness; (6) the harms from which the SHP protects the
subject outweigh any harm caused by the SHP intervention itself; and (7)
the SHP is designed to be as least restrictive as necessary.102
1. There Must Be Strong Evidence that These Conditions Are Satisfied
The first necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism
requires that the regulator limit the subject’s liberty only where it has
strong evidence that the other six conditions are satisfied. As with any
liberty limitation, there is a presumption against strong hard paternalism.103
The regulator’s burden to overcome this presumption applies not only to
the cogency of the reasons for the interference but also to the evidentiary
basis for believing that those reasons are applicable.104
In short, because the stakes (the restriction of substantially voluntary
self-regarding conduct) are so high and because we are very interested in
avoiding mistakes, the regulator must have high confidence and a reliable
basis that the following conditions are satisfied.
2.

Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Have the
Objective of Protecting the Subject from Significant Harm

The second necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism
requires that the regulator limit the subject’s liberty only in order to protect
the subject from significant harm. The severity and magnitude of harm
surely factors into the justifiability of hard paternalism. If it is too low,
then it is just not worth interfering with the subject’s liberty.
Only where the harm at issue is significant are the stakes high enough
to warrant (and outweigh) the intrusion on the subject’s autonomy.105 This
102
See Thaddeus M. Pope, A Definition and Defense of Hard Paternalism: A Conceptual and
Normative Analysis of the Restriction of Substantially Autonomous Self-Regarding Conduct 299–400
(June 10, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087383 (expanding on and defending each of the
listed conditions); see also James F. Childress & Ruth Gaare Bernheim, Beyond the Liberal and
Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1191, 1202–06
(2003) (offering six similar conditions).
103
See Pope, supra note 4, at 663–67 (discussing the “presumption of noninterference with
individual liberty”).
104
See Pope, supra note 102, at 299–309 (collecting authority).
105
See id. at 309–33 (collecting authority).
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entails two corollaries. First, only “negative” strong hard paternalism
(avoiding harm) is justifiable.106 As Friedman himself observes, cases of
“positive” strong hard paternalism (conferring a benefit), such as forcing
couch potatoes to live more active lifestyles, are not justified.107 Second,
the harm at stake must constitute a significant setback to the subject’s
critical interests (our more permanent, central, or life-defining projects) or
welfare interests (physical health and vision, integrity, and normal
functioning of one’s body).108
3. Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Restrict Only
That Conduct in Which the Subject Has a Low Autonomy Interest
While the second condition focuses on the content of the beneficence
side of the equation (i.e., which interests of the subject are impacted and by
how much are they impacted by the consequences of her conduct), the
third condition focuses on the autonomy side of the equation (i.e., what
interests does the subject have in the conduct that the regulator aims to
restrict).109
The third necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism
requires that the subject have a low autonomy interest in the restricted
conduct.110 Most people do not engage unhealthy behaviors such as poor
diet or unbuckled driving out of any deep and settled convictions as to
what is valuable for them. Consequently, restricting such conduct only
trivially disrespects their autonomy.111
4. Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Be Imposed
Only Where No Morally Preferable, Less Autonomy Restrictive
Alternatives Are Available
The fourth necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism
requires that it be a “last resort,” the only available liberty limiting
principle which the regulator can use to protect the subject from significant
harm.112
106

See id. at 312–20 (collecting authority).
See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1752 (noting that such “mandated behavior will likely prove
impractical, even when directed against a serious contributor to a health problem” such as obesity).
108
See Pope, supra note 102, at 320–34 (noting that hard paternalism can be justified where it is
beyond “a minimum threshold of necessity” and the subject’s interest is “setback to a consequential
degree”).
109
Cf. SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 150–52
(2013) (“Interference is justified on paternalistic grounds only when it reflects individuals’ actual
values, not the values we might like them to have.”).
110
Pope, supra note 102, at 333–35.
111
In contrast, this condition may not be satisfied by strong paternalism that bans religiously
motivated body piercing or mountain climbing. See id. at 347–48 (noting the difference between the
impact on liberty between regulation of these activities and cigarette smoking).
112
Id. at 368.
107
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As compared to soft paternalism and weak hard paternalism, strong
paternalism is the most morally troubling. Accordingly, we must be sure
that we really need it before we use it. If the regulatory desired ends can
be accomplished in a way that avoids conflict with individual liberty or
that interferes with liberty pursuant to a less controversial liberty-limiting
principle, then that alternative must be adopted.
5. Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Very Probably
Be an Effective Means for Achieving Its Objective
The foregoing four conditions demand both that the end or objective of
the strong hard paternalism is legitimate and that it cannot be achieved
through morally preferable (non-strong paternalistic) alternatives. The
fifth necessary condition focuses on the particular methods or means of
liberty limitation used. The fifth condition requires that the strong hard
paternalistic intervention very probably be an effective means for
achieving the objective (i.e., protecting the subject from significant
harm).113 In short, strong hard paternalism must “have a reasonable
prospect of achievement.”114
Unless there is a tight causal connection between the objective of the
strong hard paternalistic intervention and the intervention itself, the
intervention will be pointless. Why interfere with individual liberty when
doing so will not even achieve the benevolent objective? It is this intuition
that explains the failure of the New York City Big Gulp container size
limits.115
As Friedman observes, the evidence “did not support the notion that
this regulation would have any concrete effect.”116
6. Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Protect the
Subject from Harm that Outweighs Any Harm Caused by the
Intervention Itself
Even if the foregoing five conditions are satisfied, we must still ensure
that strong hard paternalism will not cause more harm than it prevents.
The sixth necessary condition for justified strong hard paternalism requires
113

Id. at 378–83.
Id. at 378.
115
See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 701 (2014) (enjoining enforcement of the rule and holding that the
Board of Health had exceeded its authority in promulgating it). But see Marcello, supra note 73, at
845–46 (arguing that “[t]he regulation’s alleged ‘loopholes’ [were] reasonable” as they, for example,
allowed consumers to buy drinks that were not “devoid of nutritional value” in containers larger than
sixteen ounces).
116
Friedman, supra note 1, at 1739. While Friedman considers the large soda ban to be soft
paternalism, see id. at 1740, it could easily be characterized as hard paternalism. While the New York
City regulation did not ban any and all “consumption of sugary drinks,” it did ban a discrete product.
See id. (noting that the container size, rather than the drink itself, was limited).
114
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that the significant harm that the agent intends to reduce or prevent through
limiting the subject’s liberty be greater than the harm caused by the liberty
limitation itself.117
In other words, not only must agents intervene for hard paternalistic
reasons only to save the subject from significant harm, but agents must
also intervene for hard paternalistic reasons only where they can probably
prevent more harm than they themselves cause.
7. Strong Hard Paternalistic Liberty Limitations Must Be as Least
Restrictive as Necessary.
We saw that hard paternalism should be the operative liberty limiting
principle only when no other alternative is available (per the fourth
condition).118 But this is not enough. Even when strong hard paternalism
is justified on the other six conditions, the scope of the strong hard
paternalistic intervention must be as narrow as possible, commensurate
with achieving the primary objective of the liberty limitation.
The seventh necessary condition for justified hard paternalism requires
that the agent interfere with the subject’s liberty no more than is required
to achieve the objective.119 The presumption against interference with
individual liberty demands not only strong moral reasons for strong hard
paternalism (conditions one to six) but also demands that the particular
means, methods, and scope of strong hard paternalism be necessary.120
V. CONCLUSION
The public health challenges that we face are enormous. Regulators
have a broad array of legal tools to address these challenges.121 But,
increasingly, the required regulatory tools are (and must be) hard
paternalistic.
Professor Friedman argues that, while efficacious, most hard
paternalistic regulation is impractical and unacceptable. In contrast, I have
demonstrated that there are wider opportunities for hard paternalism. My
promising conclusion is that regulators can have their cake and eat it too.
They must simply ensure that they enact only those hard paternalistic
measures that are weak or justified strong.
117
See Pope, supra note 102, at 385–87 (explaining the concept of proportionality and focusing
on the need to “avoid solutions that are worse than the problem”).
118
See supra text accompanying note 112; see also Pope, supra note 102, at 368 (noting that
“justified hard paternalism requires that the agent intervene . . . only where no morally preferable, less
autonomy restrictive alternatives are available”).
119
See Pope, supra note 102, at 389–400 (describing the presumption against interference with
individual liberty and the requirement that “hard paternalism . . . employ the least restrictive
alternative”).
120
Id. at 396.
121
See supra note 2.

